Before the introduction in 1990 of the beneficial `polluter pays' principle to archaeology - by which developers pay for archaeological work on their sites - many voiced concern that the tandem introduction of competitive tendering for archaeological projects would lead to severe problems for archaeology.
Competitive tendering was, nonetheless, introduced, as it was argued that tendering was a fair means to obtain a fair price for the developer.
In the event, there is no denying that tendering has provided benefits. Archaeologists are more aware, for instance, of costs and clients' needs. But the system of tendering on a project-by-project basis has also given birth to all the problems predicted six years ago. With the present system in archaeology, we have achieved the equivalent of a privatised railway in which each train is put out to tender as it leaves the station, rather than a more efficient system as a whole.
Whilst commercial pressure drives down price, it has increased costs. Regulating the competitive market on a job-by-job basis (especially by writing ever more detailed briefs and specifications) has driven costs up by at least 15 per cent. Moreover, price wars have led many contractors to abandon training and to curtail investment. Information is often not shared or published, as new techniques and methods are no longer a matter of professional debate but commercial advantage.
In addition, as contract archaeologists have to survive by winning tenders for projects with an average value of UKP3,000, often paid for by unwilling customers, rumours have spread of sharp practice and questionable project designs. `Auctions', for instance, are now said to exist where the lowest price from the first round of tenders is supplied by the developer to contractors and they are invited to match or beat it. In such a world, archaeology must itself often be the loser.
So how can we produce a more efficient system as a whole, retaining the benefits of the recent changes but solving their attendant problems?
In our present system, the two linked issues of price and quality are separated. The contract archaeologist tries to remain employed by selling a product cheaply to an unwilling customer, whilst satisfying external inspectors whose monitoring often leads to further costs. Instead, we need a system in which price and quality can be judged together, outside the cut-throat world of the present system where many of the wider public benefits of archaeology are abandoned.
A possible solution may be competitive tendering for franchises. Letting franchises allows the regulator to specify levels of performance, both in terms of cost and quality. The contractor wins by providing the best quality at a reasonable cost. Franchises could be let for each archaeological curator's area - say, each county. They could be awarded on the basis of cost, investment programme, research aims, public participation or whatever other characteristics are thought important.
Franchises would relieve the curator (an `Ofarch' in this system, to equal Ofwat and Ofgas) of the burden of dealing with multiple contractors, ever more detailed briefs, and case-by-case monitoring, and instead allow him or her to concentrate on the more important area of overall organisational performance. For the archaeological contractor, franchises would mean stability, a chance to invest both in people and technology, and a commercial imperative to address quality and cost at same time.
Franchising would represent a new level of maturity in archaeology. The State and the public could specify their needs, and tendering would establish the cost. How much commercial archaeology arising from development then took place would be a matter for the planning process.
The steps and controls involved in franchising are simple. Firstly, the required performance is specified following debate. The franchise is let following open tenders which give due regard to cost. The performance of the contractor is reviewed regularly and the whole process repeated after a few years.
Developers would retain archaeological consultants, to advise them on the costs and scope of any given project, and they would have the ability to appeal to Ofarch if they believe themselves overcharged or poorly served. Moreover, to prevent franchising leading to an archaeology dominated by a few large providers, it would be simple to restrict the number of franchises that an organisation could hold.
One blessing of recent years has been the emergence of the independent technical expert available for hire by various units. They should not feel threatened by this proposal because franchise tenderers would be wise to sub-contract highly technical work if they want to provide a low bid.
Franchising would, admittedly, require a new Act of Parliament; but with the forthcoming general election, and the various reviews currently being undertaken into archaeology in Britain, the likelihood of a new Archaeological Act is greater than it has been for some time.
John Walker is the Director of the Greater Manchester Archaeological Unit
Return to the British Archaeology homepage
© Council for British Archaeology, 1997